The King Who Chose His Enemy

Did King Vajiralongkorn, or Rama X, commit political suicide by embracing Thaksin while abandoning his own elite base? The king’s covert alliance with his dynasty’s greatest nemesis has obliterated the royalist consensus, transforming Thailand’s most steadfast monarchists into disillusioned neutrals or reluctant leftward converts. Rama X’s desperate gambit to preserve royal authority through accommodation has instead triggered the very legitimacy crisis it sought to prevent.

When Kings Lose Their Magic

The analytical framework for understanding this crisis must begin with Max Weber’s tripartite conception of legitimate domination: traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal authority. Thailand’s monarchical system has historically relied upon a synthesis of traditional and charismatic legitimacy, with the institution deriving its authority from both historical precedent and the personal qualities attributed to individual monarchs. However, the transition from the widely revered King Bhumibol Adulyadej (Rama IX) to his son Rama X has precipitated what Weber would recognise as a crisis of succession, wherein charismatic authority fails to transfer effectively to the designated heir. The monarchy’s authority now rests on “waning charismatic and traditional legitimacy”, creating a vacuum that has forced the institution to rely increasingly on coercive mechanisms and strategic alliances with political actors it previously opposed.

The concept of “Salim” or Thai elitism represents more than mere political preference; it embodies what Antonio Gramsci would identify as a hegemonic bloc seeking to maintain cultural and ideological dominance through consensus rather than coercion. Gramsci’s notion of hegemony elucidates how ruling classes maintain power not merely through force but through the active consent of the governed, achieved by presenting particular interests as universal ones. The Thai elite’s commitment to royalism has traditionally functioned as this hegemonic project, wherein monarchical veneration serves as the ideological foundation for broader social hierarchy and elite privilege. However, the monarchy’s accommodation with Thaksin Shinawatra has shattered this hegemonic consensus, creating what Gramsci termed an “organic crisis” – a moment when the ruling class loses its ability to maintain ideological leadership and must resort increasingly to coercive measures. Most significantly, many traditional elites or “Salim” have not only lost faith in the royal institution but have experienced profound public humiliation, driving some toward leftward political alignment or strategic neutrality as they abandon their historic royalist commitments.

The emergence of the People’s Party as the popular vote winner, despite being systematically excluded from power, illuminates the fundamental contradiction between democratic legitimacy and traditional authority that has plagued Thailand since 1932. At the heart of Thailand’s politics lies “an unsettled conflict over political legitimacy” concerning “whether political authority should derive from popular sovereignty or a traditional hierarchy that claims a moral right to rule”. The party’s progressive agenda – including constitutional monarchy reform, repeal of the lèse-majesté law, military restructuring, and political prisoner amnesty – represents a direct challenge to the foundational assumptions of Thailand’s hierarchical order. The systematic rejection of these democratically expressed preferences by senators and conservative forces reveals the extent to which Thailand’s political system has devolved into what can only be described as competitive authoritarianism, where democratic forms exist but are systematically subverted to prevent genuine alternation of power.

Thaksin’s Masterclass in Royal Manipulation

The formation of a coalition government involving the historically antagonistic Democrat Party and Pheu Thai represents a profound reconfiguration of Thailand’s political landscape, driven not by ideological convergence but by pragmatic necessity and elite survival instincts. Former Prime Ministers Abhisit Vejjajiva and Chuan Leekpai’s reversal of their categorical rejection of cooperation with Pheu Thai demonstrates how elite panic can override long-standing political principles. This coalition represents what might be termed “defensive elite accommodation” – a temporary alliance designed to preserve the fundamental structures of power while adapting to changing political realities. However, such arrangements typically prove unstable because they lack the ideological coherence necessary for sustained governance.

Thaksin Shinawatra’s triumphant return to Thailand after sixteen years of exile represents perhaps the most significant miscalculation in recent Thai political history. The purported “hidden deal” with King Rama X was apparently predicated on the assumption that Thaksin’s reintegration would strengthen monarchical legitimacy by demonstrating the institution’s magnanimity and power to grant clemency. Instead, this arrangement has had the opposite effect, exposing the monarchy’s vulnerability and dependence on political accommodation with its former adversaries. The deal’s apparent terms – immunity from prosecution in exchange for moderated political behaviour – signals to Thai society that even the most fundamental principles of justice and legal equality can be suspended for political convenience. This erosion of rule of law principles undermines the rational-legal legitimacy that modern states require for stable governance.

The current crisis surrounding Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s leaked conversation with Hun Sen exemplifies how the Shinawatra family’s return has created new vulnerabilities rather than resolving old conflicts. The Prime Minister faces “street protests and growing calls to resign amid mounting anger over a leaked phone call” that has damaged Thailand’s regional diplomatic standing and provided ammunition for opposition forces. The incident reveals the fundamental problem with elite accommodation: it creates moral hazard by encouraging reckless behaviour among those who believe themselves protected by special arrangements. The resignation of Bhumjaithai Party from the coalition government further demonstrates the instability inherent in politically expedient alliances lacking genuine ideological foundation.

The transformation of Jatuporn Prompao from Thaksin loyalist to opposition figure represents a microcosm of the broader elite fragmentation occurring within Thai society. This defection illustrates how patronage-based political systems become vulnerable when the patron’s ability to deliver benefits becomes questioned. Jatuporn’s alignment with traditional elites against his former benefactor suggests that the Shinawatra network’s political capital has become a liability rather than an asset, further undermining the strategic logic behind the monarchy’s accommodation with Thaksin.

When Kingdoms Fall

The implications of Thailand’s crisis extend beyond mere political competition to fundamental questions about the nature of legitimate authority in contemporary societies. The persistent invocation of Section 112 (lèse-majesté law) as a political weapon demonstrates how traditional concepts of sacred authority conflict with modern democratic principles. The rejection of progressive parties’ proposals to amend this law is justified on grounds that such reforms “amounted to an attempt to overthrow the monarchy”, revealing how legal restrictions on speech have become essential to maintaining traditional hierarchies. This dependency on coercive law rather than voluntary deference signals the weakness rather than strength of monarchical authority.

The economic dimension of Thailand’s political instability cannot be ignored, as the “sudden descent into a new political crisis threatens an economy that’s already on the brink of a technical recession”. Political uncertainty undermines investor confidence and complicates long-term economic planning, creating a vicious cycle wherein economic weakness further delegitimises political institutions. This economic vulnerability makes Thailand increasingly susceptible to external pressures and reduces the state’s capacity to maintain domestic stability through distributive mechanisms.

The international implications of Thailand’s legitimacy crisis extend throughout Southeast Asia, as the kingdom’s instability affects regional security arrangements and economic cooperation. The leaked diplomatic conversations have damaged Thailand’s carefully cultivated image as a responsible regional actor, while the persistent threat of military intervention creates uncertainty for international partners. Thailand’s democratic backsliding also complicates its relationships with Western allies who increasingly emphasise governance standards in bilateral cooperation.

The Endgame

In conclusion, Thailand’s current political crisis represents not merely another episode in the kingdom’s turbulent democratic transition but a fundamental breakdown of the elite consensus that has governed the country since 1932. The monarchy’s miscalculated accommodation with Thaksin Shinawatra has accelerated rather than arrested the institution’s legitimacy crisis, while simultaneously fragmenting the traditional elite coalition that has long served as the backbone of hierarchical authority. The systematic exclusion of popular democratic preferences, combined with the visible weakness of traditional institutions, has created conditions for prolonged instability that threaten both domestic prosperity and regional security.

The path forward requires abandoning the fantasy that hierarchical authority can survive through tactical political arrangements. Instead, Thailand must embark upon genuine constitutional reform that establishes clear boundaries between ceremonial and political authority, ensures equal application of legal standards regardless of social status, and creates institutional mechanisms for peaceful democratic alternation. This transformation will require the courage to acknowledge that monarchical authority, like all forms of political power, must ultimately derive its legitimacy from popular consent rather than historical precedent or divine sanction. Only through such fundamental restructuring can Thailand escape the cycle of elite accommodation and popular frustration that has characterised its politics for the past century, creating the foundation for stable, prosperous, and genuinely democratic governance that serves all citizens rather than privileged elites.

Prem Singh Gill
Prem Singh Gill is a Fellow at the Royal Asiatic Society (England) and a Visiting Scholar in Thai Public Universities.

Banner: BANGKOK - 2023: Photo of King of Thailand His Majesty Maha Vajiralongkorn on the side of a skyscraper. NoyanYalcin, Shutterstock