When Kingdoms Become Prison States

Thailand's Monarchy Bows to Beijing

Has Thailand's monarchy silently sanctioned the transformation of a sovereign nation into China's extraterritorial detention center, violating international law at the altar of political expedience? This question unmasks the disturbing reality behind Thailand's deportation of 40 Uyghur refugees to China — a decision that reveals not merely diplomatic calculation but potentially a fundamental reconfiguration of Thailand's sovereignty in the emerging authoritarian world order.

The pre-dawn operation that saw trucks with blacked-out windows spirit away Uyghur detainees to waiting Chinese aircraft epitomises the clandestine nature of this human rights catastrophe. For over a decade, these individuals were held in Bangkok's immigration detention centres without formal charges beyond immigration violations, their fate suspended between international protection norms and the gravitational pull of Chinese influence. That their deportation followed mere weeks after Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra's February meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping suggests not coincidence but coordination – a political transaction with human lives as currency.

What distinguishes this case from routine diplomatic manoeuvring is how it positions Thailand within the infrastructure of transnational repression. By facilitating the return of persecuted minorities to a state accused by the United Nations of crimes against humanity, Thailand has effectively volunteered itself as an extension of China's security apparatus—a satellite detention facility in Beijing's global architecture of control. This arrangement mirrors Cambodia's evolution under Hun Sen, where that country's sovereignty has become increasingly theoretical as Chinese influence permeates every level of governance. Following Cambodia's 2009 deportation of 20 Uyghur asylum seekers, Chinese investments flooded the country – economic compensation for services rendered in the persecution of China's unwanted minorities.

The parallels extend beyond Southeast Asia. Pakistan's handling of Uyghurs reflects a similar pattern of compromise, with documented cases of Pakistani authorities detaining and deporting Uyghurs to curry favour with Beijing. The Belt and Road Initiative's flagship project, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, creates powerful incentives for Pakistani compliance with Chinese security demands. Similarly, Egypt in 2017 rounded up Uyghur students studying at Al-Azhar University, deporting them to China despite having similar religious traditions that might have predicted solidarity rather than betrayal. These cases collectively illustrate how authoritarian influence radiates outward, creating what human rights scholar Alexander Cooley calls "extraterritorial authoritarian governance"– the projection of repressive capabilities beyond borders through willing partner states.

Thailand's monarchy bears particular scrutiny in this arrangement. While maintaining ceremonial distance from daily politics, the palace's silence on this fundamental question of sovereignty and human rights lends implicit approval to the government's actions. The monarchy, as Thailand's ultimate source of legitimacy, could have signalled disapproval of policies that reduce Thailand to a junior partner in transnational repression. Its failure to do so suggests either tacit support or, perhaps more troublingly, diminished independence from both domestic political actors and Chinese influence. This contrasts sharply with neighbouring Malaysia under former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, who in 2018 demonstrated genuine sovereignty by releasing 11 Uyghur detainees to Turkey despite intense Chinese pressure – proving that Southeast Asian nations can defy Beijing when genuine political will exists.

Prime Minister Paetongtarn's government has revealed itself to be a continuation of the authoritarian tendencies that characterized General Prayut's military rule, merely repackaged under civilian leadership. The appropriation of opposition proposals regarding cyber scam centres – presented as government initiatives during meetings with Chinese officials – exemplifies the cynical theatre of Thailand's supposed democratic transition. More damning still is the government's dismissal of international law: Thailand is a signatory to the Convention Against Torture, which explicitly prohibits returning individuals to countries where they face credible risks of torture. The principle of non-refoulement represents customary international law binding on all states, making Thailand's actions not merely ethically questionable but legally indefensible.

The Thai government's claim that "no other third country had stepped forward offering to take them" collapses under scrutiny, as reports indicate both Canada and the United States had offered asylum options. This fabrication suggests the decision was predetermined – not a reluctant last resort but a deliberate policy choice. When Prime Minister Paetongtarn cites "assurances" from Chinese authorities that deportees would be "looked after," she echoes dictatorships throughout history who have provided diplomatic cover for atrocities through empty guarantees.

Thailand’s Hidden Deportation Deal

What we are witnessing is the emergence of what might be called "prison state diplomacy" – a perversion of international relations where weaker states offer their sovereignty and legal systems as extensions of authoritarian powers' repressive capabilities. Thailand and Cambodia increasingly function as China's offshore detention archipelago, where Beijing can outsource the dirty work of containing, monitoring, and ultimately reclaiming dissidents and unwanted minorities. This arrangement benefits host governments through economic patronage while allowing China to maintain plausible deniability about its global repressive apparatus.

The roots of this development lie in the fundamental reconfiguration of the international order under Trump's presidency. Singapore's Defence Minister Ng Eng Hen's assessment that America's image in Asia has transformed "from liberator to disruptor to landlord seeking rent" captures the vacuum created by Washington's retreat from values-based engagement. When Secretary of State Marco Rubio condemns Thailand's deportations without meaningful consequences, he inadvertently highlights the hollowness of America's current posture – moral objection without practical influence. This contrasts sharply with earlier eras when U.S. pressure meaningfully constrained partners' worst impulses regarding human rights.

Thailand's case holds particular significance because of its historical position as America's oldest ally in the region. The annual Cobra Gold military exercises continue even as Thailand effectively serves as China's detention proxy, creating the surreal spectacle of U.S. forces training alongside military and security services implicated in transnational human rights violations. This contradictory arrangement encapsulates the incoherence of America's current approach to Asia – maintaining security partnerships while watching strategic influence steadily erode.

Inside Thailand’s Black Sites

For Thailand's citizens, these developments represent a profound betrayal of the democratic aspirations that supposedly motivated the transition from military to civilian rule. Opposition lawmaker Kannavee Suebsang's plaintive question – "What is the Thai government doing?" – reflects growing domestic recognition that Thailand's political evolution has been cosmetic rather than substantive. When the civilian government of Paetongtarn Shinawatra acts indistinguishably from the military regime it replaced on matters of fundamental rights and sovereignty, it exposes the emptiness of Thailand's democratic transition.

The Thai monarchy's position in this dynamic deserves particular scrutiny. Historically portrayed as above politics yet central to national identity, the palace has traditionally served as a counterbalance to excessive foreign influence. Its current acquiescence to policies that effectively subordinate Thai sovereignty to Chinese priorities raises profound questions about the monarchy's evolving role. Rather than serving as a bulwark against external domination, the institution appears to have accommodated itself to Thailand's diminished independence in the Chinese sphere of influence.

International human rights organisations have condemned Thailand's actions in the strongest terms. Human Rights Watch's Asia director Elaine Pearson characterised the deportations as "a blatant violation of Thailand's obligations under domestic and international laws." Amnesty International described them as "unimaginably cruel."

The broader implications of Thailand's actions extend beyond Southeast Asia to the global architecture of human rights protection. When middle powers like Thailand openly violate fundamental principles like non-refoulement without meaningful consequences, it signals to other states that international law has become optional – a menu of constraints from which governments can pick and choose based on political convenience. This erosion of normative constraints threatens to accelerate, creating a permissive environment for human rights violations globally.

What distinguishes the current situation from simple realpolitik is how it transforms sovereign states into functional extensions of authoritarian powers' security apparatuses. Thailand has not merely aligned with China diplomatically; it has volunteered its territory, legal system, and detention facilities as operational components of China's transnational repression machine. This represents a qualitatively different arrangement than traditional alliance politics – closer to vassal status than partnership. Cambodia under Hun Sen has traveled further down this path, with Chinese security personnel operating openly on Cambodian soil, particularly in Sihanoukville, where Chinese criminal organizations operate with near-impunity under implicit protection from both governments.

The concept of state sovereignty itself is being redefined through these relationships. Rather than the Westphalian model of territorial integrity and non-interference, we see emerging what political scientist Richard Sakwa calls "sovereign dependency"—the paradoxical condition where states maintain formal independence while functionally serving as extensions of more powerful patrons. Thailand and Cambodia increasingly exemplify this condition, their independence hollowed out even as traditional symbols of sovereignty remain intact.

For the Uyghur deportees themselves, the consequences are not theoretical but existential. Human rights investigators have documented systematic torture, forced labor, sexual violence, and cultural erasure in Xinjiang's detention facilities. By delivering these individuals directly to Chinese custody, Thailand has not merely violated international law – it has potentially facilitated crimes against humanity. The Thai government's acceptance of Chinese "assurances" regarding the deportees' welfare defies credibility given the overwhelming evidence of systematic abuse documented by the United Nations and human rights organizations.

Conclusion

In a nutshell, Thailand's deportation of Uyghur refugees reveals the emergence of "prison state diplomacy" – where Thailand functions as China's extraterritorial detention apparatus while violating principles of non-refoulement and the Convention Against Torture. The Thai monarchy's calculated silence enables this surrender of sovereignty to Beijing's security imperatives. As liberal democracies retreat from Southeast Asia, nations maintain formal treaty commitments while treating international law as optional guidance. Thailand illustrates how quickly countries transform from supporters of the rules-based order to instruments of its erosion when traditional sources of legitimacy abandon their role as defenders of universal norms – establishing a blueprint for authoritarian expansion through the hollowing out of both sovereignty and legal obligations.

Prem Singh Gill

Prem Singh Gill is a Visiting Scholar at the Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Indonesia and a Visiting Scholar in Thai Public Universities.